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Abstract 
School choice and accountability have become popular educational policies in the US and the UK. In 
Europe, such policies are less often applied. Moreover, even when school choice exists, information on 
school quality is rarely provided, leading to pupil sorting by observable characteristics. In this paper, we 
estimate how the regional intensity of school choice and the regional percentage of selective schools relate 
to student  test scores in math, reading and science at age 15. We estimate an education production 
function exploiting regional aggregation in 8 European countries to reduce potential endogeneity bias. We 
find that both the regional intensity of school choice and that of school selectivity are correlated with 
significantly higher student test scores.  
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1.  Introduction 
One of the first empirical studies of the factors that influence student's scholastic 
results was the 'Coleman Report' (Coleman et al.1966). The authors found that, in the 
US, more financial resources in schools were not significantly related to higher student 
test scores. To the contrary, the most important predictor of test scores was the socio-
economic background of pupils. Since then, international research has not produced 
clear-cut  evidence  on  the  effect  of  additional  funding  on  student  performance 
(Hanushek,  2003).  As  a  result,  attention  shifted  to  other  factors  that  could  have  a 
significant impact on student test scores. In particular, authors turned to the incentives 
to teacher and student effort that resulted from the institutional settings of educational 
systems (Hanushek, 1997; Woessmann, 2003). This paper fits into the latter category as 
we study how the regional practice of school choice and school selectivity relate to 
student test scores. 
In the United States as well as in the United Kingdom, allowing free school choice 
has become a popular guideline of educational policy. The idea behind this type of 
policy is that the possibility of school choice combined with information on school 
quality will result in competition between schools. This is predicted to create incentives 
for schools to perform better as they try to attract more pupils and/or more funding. In 
short, schools are expected to increase their effort in providing high quality education. 
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However,  there  are  severe  impediments  to  the  realisation  of  this  prediction 
following the introduction of school choice. First of all, there is the absence of sanctions 
for low-performing schools. Incentives to productivity in a classical market are ensured 
by inefficient firms leaving the market. But low-performing schools are rarely closed 
since  they  are  public  institutions.  As  a  consequence,  if  school  choice  is  to  deliver 
incentives  to  effort  for  low-performing  schools,  sanctions  and/or  help  for  quality 
improvement should be provided by the educational authority.  
A further obstacle to the functioning of school competition as an incentive for 
school  effort  could  be  the  unavailability  of  information  on  school  performance. 
Information on school performance is a crucial requirement for school competition to 
be effective in increasing school effort. As parents and institutions are able to identify 
the  low-performing  schools,  these  can  be  sanctioned  (or  helped)  accordingly.  If 
information on school performance is not (publicly) available, as is often the case in 
Europe, school choice may foster segregation and selectivity of schools. In effect, in the 
absence of objective information on school quality, parents will tend to choose their 
children’s school based on observed quality of the peer pupils, contributing to sorting of 
pupils  by  socio-economic  status  and  abilities  at  entry.  In  such  a  context,  schools 
moreover  have  an  incentive  to  select  pupils  according  to  performance.  In  effect, 
admitting only better performing pupils ensures the schools a good reputation at low 
costs, because lower performing pupils do not need to be taken care off.  
The sorting of pupils that results from school selectivity and parents’ peer-based 
school choice may have several effects on pupil performance. On the one hand, pupil 
sorting generates specific peer effects. Theoretical models predict that low performing 
pupils will suffer and high performing pupils will benefit from being grouped according 
to ability. However the evidence on peer effects in the empirical literature is mixed (see 
e.g.  Levin  2001,  Rangvid  2003).  Low-performing  pupils  may  face  lower  teacher 
expectations  and  develop  less  confidence  in  their  learning  skills  as  they  and  their 
teachers  are  aware  of  being  classified  in  a  low  ability  school/group.  But  teaching 
methods and materials may be better adapted to match the ability of the group. 
On the other hand, selectivity of secondary schools may provide an incentive to 
effort in primary school pupils similar to that of an external evaluation standard (see e.g. 
Bishop and Mane 2001). That is, pupils may increase effort in order to have better 
chances  of  being  admitted  to  selective  secondary  schools.  When  the  percentage  of 
selective schools increases and thereby the chance of admittance to a secondary school 
with high ability peer pupils, pupils will have an incentive to increase effort. 
Most of the existing empirical research on school competition has been done on 
United States data. A large share of this research focuses on evaluating the impact of the 
introduction of vouchers and charter schools on student performance (see e.g. Ladd, 
2002, Holmes et al., 2003, or Neal, 2002). A more limited strand of the literature focuses 
on general indicators of school choice and competition (see e.g. Hoxby, 2003). In their 
reviews of the literature, Belfield and Levin (2002) as well as Hoxby (2002) come to the 
conclusion that a majority of studies finds significant positive effects of the level of 
school competition on student performance. However, Belfield and Levin (2002) also 
remind us that these effects are too small to allow any policy recommendations. 
The availability of external information on school performance seems to lead to 
achievement  growth  in  the  United  States,  especially  when  sanctions  apply  for  low-
performing schools (Carnoy and Loeb 2003, West and Peterson 2005, Hanushek and  
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Raymond  2004).  The  effect  of  school  accountability  on  low-performing  students’ 
achievement is not clear. Some studies find a particularly important positive impact on 
low-performing and disfavoured students (e.g. West and Peterson 2005), others find a 
positive  but  less  important  impact  on  low  than  on  better-performing  students' 
achievement (e.g. Hanushek and Raymond 2004). Measures of school accountability are 
quite diverse in the literature, making it difficult to compare the size of the effects.  
In most European states, education is largely funded and provided by the public 
sector.  Uncertainty  as  to  political  impact  of  competition  between  schools  and  the 
outcomes of external school evaluations are important sources of  reluctance against 
such  policies.  As  a  result,  evidence  on  the  level  of  school  competition  outside  the 
United States is scarce and heterogeneous. Recent reviews can be found in Gibbons et 
al. (2006) or Burgess and Slater (2006). To sum up, one can say that most evidence 
mainly  comes  from  only  4  countries  (the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark,  Sweden  and 
Israel), that the studies are hardly comparable and that results are mixed. For the UK, 
Levacic (2004) finds a positive effect of the perceived level of school competition by 
school directors on test scores and Bradley et al. (2000) find that schools that are under 
more competition are also more efficient. But Burgess and Slater (2006) and Gibbons et 
al. (2006), both exploiting the geographical boundaries of the educational market as a 
source of exogenous variation in school choice in the UK, find no significant effect of 
increased school choice on pupil performance. In Sweden, using the introduction of a 
generalised  voucher  system,  Sandström  and  Bergström  (2002)  find  a  small  but 
significant positive impact on test scores of increased school choice. To the contrary, in 
Denmark, Andersen (2005) finds no effect of the relatively more important competition 
in private versus public schools on student performance. Lavy (2005), using a policy 
change to identify the effect of increased school competition in Israel, concludes to a 
lower dropout rate and higher graduation rates for schools subject to higher levels of 
competition.  
 In this paper, we provide descriptive evidence as to the relation between school 
choice,  school  selectivity  and  student  performance in a  set  of countries  where  little 
research exists on this topic. Unfortunately we cannot go as far as to identify causal 
effects but we do try to take the most out of the available data to develop insights into 
the relation between school choice and selectivity with student performance in countries 
that  do  not  yet  have  sufficiently  good  data  to  go  further.  To  this  purpose,  we  use 
responses  to  the  PISA  2003  questionnaires  in  8  different  countries.  We  have 
information as to whether schools give high priority to student records for admission 
and  we  know  from  the  pupil’s  questionnaire  whether the  pupil  claims  to  attend  its 
school because of its good reputation rather than the distance to the parents’ home or 
the religious character of the school.  
We estimate an education production function on the pooled data for these 8 
countries  to  assess  the  relation  between  regional  school  choice  and  selectivity  and 
student  test  scores.  In  a  second  stage,  we  discuss  possible  interpretations  of  the 
measured effects and then perform quantile regressions to estimate differences in the 
effect for low versus better-performing pupils. In section 2 we present the dataset. In 
section 3, we justify our choice of measures of school choice and selectivity. Section 4 
contains  the  estimation  strategy  and  descriptive  statistics  of  the  main  explanatory 
variables. Section 5 is devoted to the interpretation of the results and conclusions follow 
in section 6.  
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2.  The data  
This paper uses cross-section data from the OECD survey conducted in 2003 as 
part  of  the  Program  for  International  Student  Assessment  (PISA).  The  PISA  2003 
database  contains  comparable  math,  science  and reading  test  scores  of  a  sample  of 
pupils of about 15 years-old (sampled based on birth year) coming from 40 OECD and 
non-OECD countries. All the students in the sample took a standard reading, math, 
and/or science test, which provided the test scores. The scores are comparable across 
countries but not across disciplines. The sampling procedure ensures that schools and 
pupils  inside  them  are  randomly  selected  and  that  the  sampled  set  of  students  is 
representative of the country’s student population. Pupils are nested within schools, 
potentially attending different grades. For each pupil i trained in school j, the PISA data 
provides us with a large number of variables characterizing the student, its family and 
the school it is attending, from which we selected the variables relevant to our analysis. 
Following a common practice in the literature (Brown, 1991; Vignoles et al., 2000), and 
in order to ease interpretation of estimates, we use the test scores normalized to mean 
500 and variance 100 as a measure of educational output. Five different measures of the 
obtained test scores (so-called Plausible Values) are provided for each discipline in the 
dataset.  In  line  with  the  recommendations  of  the  PISA  Manual,  estimations  are 
performed separately for each of the Plausible Values and then averaged. We use the 
student weights to ensure the representativeness of the sample of pupils. 
We have used the stratification of the dataset to retrieve in which regions the 
schools are located. This information is available only for 18 countries which we keep in 
our dataset. In the remaining countries, either the data is not stratified by regions, or 
information as to what the criterion for stratification was is not publicly available. Eight 
out of the obtained sample of 18 countries have a central educational authority. This is 
the sample we use to perform  the estimations and corresponds to 150 regions and 
36290 observations after removal of missing observations. The reasons for including 
only those 8 countries are related to the estimation strategy and are explained in section 
4. 
3.  Measuring school choice and selectivity 
We use the pupil questionnaire to retrieve information on school choice. This 
information will be aggregated at a regional level (see section 4). The pupils are asked 
whether they “attend their school because it is known to be a good school”. If the pupil 
responded  ‘yes’  then  we  consider  there  has  been  quality-based  school  choice.  The 
dummy SCHOOLCHOICE then equals one, zero otherwise. One might be concerned 
that our measure of school choice is based on the pupil’s perception and therefore a 
subjective indicator. However, we have reasons to believe that the pupil’s answers do 
provide a reasonable approximation of effective school choice.  
First of all, this question is part of a set of sub questions that propose alternative 
reasons  to  attend  this  particular  school.  The  alternatives  are:  being  in  this  school 
because it is close to the pupil’s home, because of its program, or for religious reasons. 
The question as to the school’s reputation is therefore clearly referring to academic 
quality of the school.   
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Secondly,  one  might  suspect  that  the  pupil  could  also  include  in  the  school’s 
“good” reputation criteria that are not related to the quality of teaching but to their 
general appreciation of the school. We therefore look at two measures of pupil well 
being in the school (feeling awkward or lonely in school) and test whether they are 
related to answering that the attended school is good. There is no significant correlation 
between feeling awkward or lonely in school and claiming to attend a school because of 
its reputation. It does therefore not seem to be the case that the well being of the pupil 
is the basis for claiming to be in a good school. 
Thirdly, responding that the school choice was based on reputation is negatively 
correlated with responding that it was based on vicinity. Pupils that claim to be in their 
current school because of vicinity are half as likely to claim also quality based school 
choice than those who did not mention vicinity as a reason for school choice (17.73 
versus 32.01 percent). Although these two reasons can clearly be valid simultaneously, 
vicinity should restrict the possibility of quality based school choice. The descriptive 
statistics are in line with this intuition. 
Fourthly, we expect school choice to be more straightforward in cities, where 
more than one school may be close to the parents’ home. In our data, the percentage of 
pupils that claim to attend their school because of its reputation increases linearly with 
city size. Whereas in villages only 11% of the pupils claim to be in their school because 
of its reputation, 45% do so in large cities of more than a million inhabitants (Table 1). 
This supports our assumption that our measure of school choice reflects the actual 
possibilities of quality-based school choice. 
 
Table 1: Percentage of pupils that claim to attend their school because it is know to be a good school by 
number of books at home, parent education level and city size. 
Number  of 
books at home 
  Parent 
education 
  City size   
Less than 10  24%  None  22%  Less than 3000  11% 
11 to 25  24%  ISCED 1  30%  3 to 15 000  20% 
26 to 100  24%  ISCED 2  21%  15 to 100 000  26% 
101 to 200  26%  ISCED 3B,C  21%  100  000  to  1 
million 
30% 
201 to 500  29%  ISCED 3A-4  25%  More  than  1 
million 
45% 
More than 500  32%  ISCED 5B  19%     
    ISCED 5A-6  32%     
Source: PISA 2003 data, OECD. 
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Furthermore,  more  educated  parents  could  be  more  likely  to  choose  schools 
based on reputation, creating a selection bias among pupils that respond yes to school 
choice. The data do not point to such an issue. The proportion of pupils that claim to 
be in their school because of its reputation is similar across parent education levels as 
well as between families with different numbers of books (see Table 1).  
To sum up, our subjective measure of school choice is in line with some basic 
assumptions we have about school choice. Measured school choice increases with city 
size  and  is  less  frequent  among  pupils  that  claim  to  attend  their  school  because  of 
vicinity. Pupils from different socio-economic backgrounds claim quality-based school 
choice in a similar proportion, and the alternative reasons for school choice should 
make clear to the pupil that a ‘good school’ refers to the quality of the teaching. The 
information we have on the well being of the pupil in the school is not correlated with 
claiming to attend a good school. 
Finally,  the  fact  that  our  indicator  of  school  choice  is  based  on  the  pupil’s 
perception also has an advantage compared to e.g. an institutional indicator. In effect, 
even  when  school  choice  is  constrained  by  law  parents  may  change  their  place  of 
residence in order to give their children the possibility to attend a better school. To the 
contrary, even when school choice is fully unconstrained by legislation, there may be 
other barriers to exerting this choice such as the proximity of schools to the parents’ 
home. By using pupil level information on school choice we avoid these problems of 
non compliance to the legislation. 
The  information  on  school  selectivity  is  taken  from  the  school  questionnaire. 
School directors are asked “how much consideration is given to the following factors 
when students are admitted to your school?” If the school director answered that a 
student’s academic record (including placement tests) is a prerequisite or a high priority 
for admittance (rather than considered or not considered at all) the school is considered 
to be selective and the dummy SCHOOLSELECTS set to one. 
4.  The estimation strategy 
We aggregate the dummy variables SCHOOLCHOICE and SCHOOLSELECTS 
to regional percentages: the regional percentage of students that claim to be in their 
school because it is known to be a good school (PERCENTCHOICE) and the regional 
percentage of schools that claim to admit students based on their academic record (as a 
high priority or as a prerequisite) PERCENTSELECT. There are two important reasons 
to do so: the aggregated variables are more meaningful as measures of school incentives 
and the aggregation is a partial answer to the likely endogeneity problem of school 
choice and selectivity. 
 The percentage of pupils that claim to attend their school because it is known to 
be good is a measure of the intensity of school choice in a given region. A region may 
present a high degree of school choice for several reasons. The regional intensity of 
school choice by parents can be a result of legislation (that determines whether they may 
choose at all) but also of geography (if there are few local schools choice is limited) or 
variance in school quality (if all schools have the same quality, residence becomes the 
main criterion). Which explanation for the intensity of school choice is most relevant in 
a  given  region  is  not  relevant  for  our  question  of  interest.  Whichever  explanation 
dominates, the relevance of school choice as an incentive for schools to perform better  
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should increases with the proportion of parents participating and the schools’ incentive 
to  perform  should  be  maximal when all  parents use  quality  criterions.  The  regional 
intensity of school choice therefore seems a reasonable measure of the incentive to 
effort provided to schools.  
Descriptive statistics of the regional percentage of schools giving a high priority to 
student records for admittance and the regional percentage of pupils that claim to attend 
their school because it is known to be a good school are presented in Figure 1. We 
observe that there is important regional variation in both variables and that our measure 
of  the  regional  intensity of  school  choice  is  compatible  with  what  we  know  of  the 
national educational systems.
3 For instance, Finland and Iceland allocate pupils to a 
school  in  their  neighbourhood.  Attending  another  school  is  an  exception  in  these 
countries. The percentage of pupils  that claim to attend their school because of its 
reputation is of about 10 percent there (Figure 1). On the other hand, in the Czech 
Republic and Turkey, parents have free school choice and PERCENTCHOICE is of 
about 50 percent. Secondly, even when the legal setting allows school choice, choice 
may be constrained by geographical isolation or limited differences in school quality. 
Therefore  PERCENTCHOICE  may  be  lower  than  expected  from  the  institutional 
setting in certain countries. In Italy and Portugal for instance, school choice is free but 
only about 20 percent of pupils claim to be in their school because it is known to be 
good.  
                                                 
3 Source: Eurydice.com  
EJCE, vol. 5, n. 2 (2008) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
140 
Figure 1: Descriptive statistics PERCENTSELECT and PERCENTCHOICE, by country. 
Legend: Stripes = PERCENTCHOICE, Plain= PERCENTSELECT. 
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Our second main explanatory variable, the percentage of schools that use student 
academic records as a high priority admittance criterion (or as a requirement) in a given 
region is a proxy for the intensity of pupil sorting by performance across schools. It is 
unclear whether pupil sorting by ability has positive or negative aggregate effects on 
pupil  performance.  Sorting  by  ability  may  have  negative  effects  on  low-performing 
pupils because of negative peer effects, but positive effects on high-performing pupils as 
they benefit from high-performing peers. Lower teacher expectations and stigmatisation 
may  further  lower  effort  of  low-performing  pupils.  On  the  other  hand,  the  low-
performing pupils may benefit from more adapted teaching methods in a similar peer 
group. Furthermore, selectivity of secondary schools may provide an incentive to effort 
in  primary  school  pupils  similar  to  that  of  an  external  evaluation  standard  (see  e.g. 
Bishop and Mane 2001). That is, pupils may increase effort in order to have better 
chances  of  being  admitted  to  selective  secondary  schools.  When  the  percentage  of 
selective schools increases and thereby the chance of admittance to a secondary school 
with high ability peer pupils, more pupils will have an incentive to increase effort. Which 
effects dominate is a topic of empirical investigation.  
Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of PERCENTSELECT and PERCENTCHOICE. 
First of all this figure makes clear that in many regions there is no school selectivity at 
all. Secondly, we observe that the two variables are not strongly correlated. 
 
Figure 2: Scatter plot PERCENTCHOICE – PERCENTSELECT (regional percentages). 
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Source: PISA 2003 data, OECD. 
 
The  second  reason  why  we  choose  to  use  regional  variables  is  that  both  the 
dummy variables of school selectivity and school choice are potentially subject to both a 
reverse causality and to an omitted variables problem. Indeed, there may be a problem 
of  reverse  causality  in  the  estimation  at  the  school  and  at  the  individual  level:  the 
observed better school performance may lead more parents to choose a given school.  
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And at the individual pupil level, parents of better pupils may more often pay care to the 
choice of high quality school.  
Furthermore it is likely that schools that choose to select pupils by ability at the 
entry have unobserved characteristics that relate to student performance and that  
parents that choose a school on the basis of reputation or program might be more 
educated and/or motivated as they want to provide their children with best possible 
learning environment. The omission of these variables may bias our estimates. 
Regional aggregation is a way to limit the type of endogeneity biases mentioned 
above. In effect, bias due to unobserved school and parent characteristics is no longer 
an issue as we measure choice and selectivity at the regional level. We interpret the 
regional proportion of schools selecting pupils at entry and the proportion of pupils 
claiming  to  attend  schools  because  of  their  reputation  as  proxies  for  the  regional 
preference for school choice and school selectivity. Such preference may emerge from 
the institutional setting or regional common practice. The absence of information on 
schools’ actual performance is for instance thought to be an important determinant of 
the presence of school admittance criteria. The impact of the regional preference for or 
common practice of school choice is precisely what we want to estimate.  
We include several regional characteristics we think could be related to school 
choice such as the average socio-economic status of parents in the region, the regional 
unemployment rate (as a proxy for economic welfare) and average class size (as a proxy 
for educational budget). The idea is that using a specification with regional variables, the 
coefficients  of  our  main  explanatory  variables  do  not  merely  capture  regional  fixed 
effects but more specifically variance in test scores related to the included variables. 
However, unobserved characteristics of the regions may still bias our results. The 
intensity of school choice and selectivity may e.g. be related to unobserved institutional 
characteristics such as the quality of educational policy that affects both test scores and 
the amount of school choice thereby biasing our estimates. The PISA data are repeated 
cross-sections, making it impossible to apply fixed effects panel estimations to control 
for unobserved regional characteristics. Furthermore, the information as to the regional 
location of schools is only available from PISA 2003, preventing the use of pseudo-
panel techniques to remove the regional fixed effects.  
As a consequence, we include only countries that have a central authority for 
educational policy. The idea is to ensure that the country fixed effects will capture an 
important share of the unobserved institutional effects. Indeed, the country fixed effects 
will only capture unobserved characteristics that are the same for all individuals in the 
country. Such fixed effects are thus expected to play their role better in a centralised 
system, where all pupils are affected by similar country characteristics. In a regional 
system,  we  expect  a  lot  less  common  national  unobserved  characteristics  and 
coefficients should rather be biased by regional unobserved characteristics. In case of a 
regional educational system, one would prefer to use regional fixed effects, but this is 
not possible as our variables of interest are regional. We thus use only countries with a 
centralised educational system where the country dummies are most reliable. Federal 
states such as Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, Spain and Australia are 
therefore excluded. We also exclude the United Kingdom, where educational policy is 
managed  by  the  regional  authorities  and  Mexico  which  decentralised  its  educational  
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system in 1992.
4 This leaves 8 countries which all have a central educational authority. 
The Czech Republic is in the process of a decentralisation since 2001 but we chose to 
keep it as the change is very recent and the country dummy should still capture most of 
the national characteristics in 2003.  
4.1. The education production function 
We  estimate  an  education  production  function.  It  is  defined  as  an  efficient 
technology (Cooper and John, 1997) turning a vector of educational inputs X into a 
vector of output Y: 
 
(1)  Y = f(X)  
 
In Equation (1) above, X may include such inputs as a child’s abilities, his/her 
family background and/or educational resources, and where Y may be a set of test 
scores or exam results. In theoretical works, the education production function f may 
appear as a “black box”, with its the functional form left unspecified. Applied analyses, 
however, generally rely on a classical regression approach, which assumes a linear (or 
log-linear) shape for f.  
Using a mixed model allows us to take into account the hierarchically correlated 
structure  of  the  test  score  variance.  Indeed  students  are  grouped  in  schools  that 
function in a particular regional and/or national setting. It is to be expected that test 
scores  of  students  in  a  same  school  are  correlated  with  each  other  as  a  result  of 
unobserved school characteristics. In a similar way, average achievement of pupils in a 
same  region  could  be  correlated  as  they  are  submitted  to  a  common  political  and 
economic environment.  
Such models, also known as multilevel models (Yang, Goldstein et al, 2002), are 
frequently used in estimating education production functions since samples of pupils are 
generally nested inside classrooms, schools and regions. We include country dummies to 
capture unobserved country effects, and school and regional effects that are assumed to 
be drawn from a normal distribution. The unobserved regional effects are assumed to 
be ‘nested’ because they may be correlated inside a same country.  
Mixed models are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood technique imposing 
the  particular  hierarchical  structure  to  the  variance-covariance  matrix.  Singer  (1998) 
provides a detailed summary of this estimation procedure. 
4.2. Control variables 
Besides  our  variables  of  interest,  Table  2  gives  summary  statistics  of  our 
dependant and explanatory variables. The latter were chosen in order to stay as close as 
possible  to  the  conceptual  framework  sketched  in  the  theoretical  literature  (e.g., 
Creemer, 1994; Scheerens, 1997; Creemers et al., 2000). A small number of factors are 
herein put forward to explain pupils’ success: their initial aptitudes, perseverance or 
effort, the opportunities offered to them, and the quality of instruction. 
                                                 
4 Information  as to the degree of centralisation of the education  systems was taken from the UNESCO (IBE) 
website.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean   Std Dev 
Dependant variables     
Maths test scores  500  100 
Reading test scores  500  100 
Science test scores  500  100 
Explanatory variables     
Percentchoice  0,25  0,15 
Percentselect  0,15  0,23 
Mean socio-eco status region  48,21  4,91 
Mean class size region  12,46  4,74 
Unemployment rate region  7,70  4,60 
Age  15,77  0,29 
Boy  0,5  0,5 
Number of books at home  3,45  1,35 
Non-nuclear family  0,25  0,43 
Home educational resources  0  1 
Parent education  3,99  1,67 
City size  2,99  0,96 
Grade  9,73  0,61 
School educational material  0  1 
Centralbudget  0,32  0,47 
Centralcontent  0,39  0,49 
Centralhiring  0,57  0,49 
Centralwage  0,82  0,38 
Mean nb. of books at home (school level)  3,45  0,70 
Mean parent education school  3,99  0,96 
Vocational school  0,27  0,45 
Observations  36 290 
Source: PISA 2003 data, OECD.  
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Relying on an extensive literature (e.g. Ehrenberg, Goldhaber et al 1995; McNabb, 
Sarmistha et al, 2002), we control for gender (the dummy BOY) and AGE as observable 
individual characteristics.  
We  then  chose  relevant  measures  and/or  proxies  for  the  two  last  groups  of 
factors  listed  above,  starting  with  the  opportunities  offered  to  pupils.  These  are 
represented firstly by the size of the city the pupil lives in (CITY SIZE), as an index 
from  1  (village  of  less  than  3000  inhabitants)  to  6  (city  of  more  than  a  million 
inhabitants). A larger city may e.g. provide more social services, a better library or simply 
have access to better teaching materials. Another very important determinant of overall 
opportunities available is the pupil’s family background. This includes information on 
whether the pupil lives with both parents
5 (NON-NUCLEAR FAMILY dummy), the 
level of education of the highest educated parent according to the ISCED classification 
(PARENT EDUCATION). We also included an index (1 - 6) for the number of books 
in the house as estimated by the student (NUMBER OF BOOKS), and the relative 
availability  of  learning  resources  at  home  (HOME  EDUC.  RESOURCES
6).  Several 
studies (e.g. Murnane et al, 1981) suggest that the number of books at home is a fairly 
reliable  proxy  to  describe  a  family’s  inclination  towards  learning.  Home  educational 
resources is an index based on the availability at home of a desk to study at, a quiet place 
to study, a calculator and a dictionary as well as books useful for homework. For more 
details  on  the  construction  if  this  index  please  refer  to  OECD  (2003).  As  regional 
control variables, we include the unemployment rate (based on the PISA sample), and 
the average level of the socio-economic index of occupational status. 
The  quality  of  instruction  was  captured  by  several  school  variables.  We  first 
introduce  information  on  the  school's  educational  resources  (SCHOOL  EDUC. 
MATERIAL)  as  an  index  based  on  the  availability  of  books,  computers,  software, 
calculators,  library  materials,  audio-visual  and  laboratory  equipment.  Secondly  we 
include  information  on  whether  the  pupil  attends  a  vocational  or  general  type  of 
secondary school (VOCED) and the attended GRADE. We include class size only as a 
regional average because this information is missing for a large number of schools.  
Furthermore, many studies (Hanushek 1997, 2003; Hoxby, 2000) underline that 
the effect of material resources is not systematic, and suggest that institutional factors 
and  incentives  structures  may  have  a  strong  effect  via  motivation  and  effort.  For 
instance Woessmann (2000), using country-level data from PISA, found that students’ 
performance  could  stem  primarily  from  institutional  and  school  organizational 
characteristics, such as autonomy in school management decisions. To take into account 
this  possibility,  we  added  4  school-level  institutional  indicators  the  degree  of 
centralization of the decisions made on teacher hiring, wage increases, the size of the 
school budget, and defining course contents, as well as two measures of peer quality at 
the school level (the average number of books at home and parent education by school). 
4.3. The estimated specifications 
This  section  presents  the  different  estimated  specifications  of  the  education 
production  function.  In  a  first  specification,  we  estimate  the  effect  of 
                                                 
5 The NON-NUCLEAR FAMILY dummy equals one if the student does not live with a mother and a father. 
6 HEDRES in the PISA terminology, it is based on the availability of a dictionary, a quiet place to study, a desk to 
study, textbooks and calculator at home.  
EJCE, vol. 5, n. 2 (2008) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
146 
PERCENTCHOICE  including  only  country  dummies  Dk,  regional  and  individual 
control variables: 
 
(1) 
 
 
where for student i in school s in region j in country k, SCORE is the test score in 
a given discipline, γ and λ ,the random regional and school effects, assumed to be drawn 
from  a  normal  distribution  and  regions  nested  within  their  country  and  εijk  is  the 
residual term, also assumed to be normally distributed.  
In  specification  1,  the  coefficient  of  PERCENTCHOICE  measures  the  total 
effect of school choice. It includes the impact of the potential increase in effort and/or 
discouragement resulting from school competition, and the impact of pupil sorting on 
test scores. 
In  a  second  step,  we  then  include  PERCENTSELECT  and  two  measures  of 
school peer effects (the average number of books at home and parent education by 
school). The aim is to disentangle the effect of pupil sorting according to performance 
and  related  peer  effects  from  the  residual  effect  of  school  choice.  This  yields 
specification 2: 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
In this specification we interpret the coefficient of PERCENTCHOICE as the 
correlation  between  test  scores  and  school  effort  related  to  school  choice.  The 
coefficient  of  PERCENTSELECT  is  interpreted  as  a  measure  of  the  correlation 
between test scores and school selectivity net of peer effects i.e. as variation in test 
scores related to pupil motivation to enter a selective secondary school, and to specific 
teaching methods. 
Low  versus  high-performing  pupils  might  react  differently  to  the  presence  of 
school choice and sorting. As mentioned in the introduction, once we control for peer 
effects,  pupil  sorting  may  affect  test  scores  through  several  other  channels  such  as 
adapted teaching methods, teacher and pupil expectations, and an incentive to pupil 
effort due to selection at the entry of secondary school. Low performing pupils could 
face  lower  teacher  expectations  and  decrease  effort,  while  benefiting  from  adapted 
teaching methods. High and average performing students on the other hand may be 
motivated  by  the  possibility  to  enter  a  selective  secondary  school  and  benefit  from 
higher teacher expectations and high quality teaching. 
Besides increasing the degree of pupil sorting, school choice might lead to higher 
standards of performance and school effort. These may have either positive or negative 
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impacts on student results, as schools put more effort into different types of pupils and 
increasing  standards  may  discourage  low  performing  pupils  while  pushing  average 
performing students to more effort (e.g. Betts and Grogger 2003).. 
In order to test whether school choice and pupil sorting affect low versus high 
performing pupils differently in our model, we apply the quantile regression procedure 
to specification 2. This allows us to compare the effect of PERCENTCHOICE and 
PERCENTSELECT  across  quantiles  of  pupil  performance.  Technically,  quantile 
regressions consist  of a  generalization of the conditional median estimation or least 
absolute deviation (Koenker, 2000). It was "rediscovered", developed and introduced in 
the economic literature by Koenker & Bassett (1978). It is a method of estimation of 
conditional  quantile  functions  for  any  quantile  θ  of  the  dependent  variable.  When 
estimating quantiles, absolute deviations are given positive and negative weights, in such 
a way that a fraction θ of the observations will lie below the fitted line while a fraction (1 
–θ) will lie above it.  
The q
th quantile coefficients are obtained as a solution to the expression below: 
 
(3) 
 
 
 
 
where Y stands for test scores. We estimate equation 3 for 5 different quantiles 
(percentiles 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90) so as to obtain our set of coefficients across 
levels of pupil performance. We do not use a mixed model to perform the quantile 
regression. However, country fixed effects are included and we use the same student 
weights as in the other specifications. 
5.  Results 
Table 3 gives the parameter and standard deviation estimates of specification 1 for 
mathematics, reading and science test scores respectively. Recall from Section 2 that test 
scores are standardised at mean 500 and standard deviation 100 for all countries. This 
means we can interpret the coefficients as percentages of standard deviation in student 
test scores. The effect of an increase of one standard deviation of PERCENTCHOICE 
is  computed  as  the  coefficient  in  Table  3  times  the  standard  deviation  of 
PERCENTCHOICE found in Table 1 (0.15). 
 



 



− − + − ∑ ∑
< ≥
∈
β
θ
β
θ β β θ β θ
. : . :
. ) 1 ( .
i i
k
x Score i
i i
x Score i
i i R x Y x Y Min 
EJCE, vol. 5, n. 2 (2008) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
148 
Table 3: Estimates specification 1, Dependant variable: test scores in Maths, Reading and Science.  
  Maths  Read  Science 
Effect  Coeff.    StdErr  Coeff.    StdErr  Coeff.    StdErr 
Intercept  47,36    44,28  162,43  ***  41,54  70,07    40,58 
Percentchoice  83,83  ***  29,00  83,83  ***  26,13  82,80  ***  25,44 
Socio eco status 
region  -0,52    0,92  -0,69    0,83  -0,76    0,81 
Class size region  -1,83  ***  0,67  -1,28  **  0,60  -1,40  **  0,59 
Unemployment 
rate region  -2,02  **  0,89  -1,84  **  0,81  -1,66  *  0,78 
Boy  24,43  ***  0,81  -28,15  ***  0,83  2,64  ***  0,82 
Age  2,29    1,39  -2,47    1,43  6,93  *  1,41 
Number of 
books at home  12,21  ***  0,34  9,31  ***  0,35  11,06  ***  0,35 
Non-nuclear 
family  -7,60  ***  0,86  -7,50  ***  0,88  -2,87  *  0,87 
Home educ 
Resources  7,94  ***  0,38  8,43  ***  0,39  7,38  ***  0,39 
Parents' 
education  3,15  ***  0,26  2,99  ***  0,26  3,46  ***  0,26 
City size  7,90  ***  0,70  9,43  ***  0,71  6,89  ***  0,70 
Grade  31,34  ***  0,77  31,28  ***  0,79  29,65  ***  0,78 
School educ. 
Material  3,67  ***  0,70  3,27  ***  0,71  3,32  ***  0,71 
Centralbudget  8,43  ***  1,55  5,37  **  1,58  6,28  ***  1,56 
Centralcontent  -1,88    1,47  -1,77    1,50  0,28    1,48 
Centralhiring  -4,33  *  2,42  -2,51    2,48  -3,81    2,45 
Centralwage  -2,51    2,57  -0,80    2,64  -2,29    2,60 
Vocational 
school  -41,98  ***  1,41  -42,53  ***  1,45  -41,63  ***  1,43 
Country 
dummies  yes  yes  yes 
*,**,*** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. 
Number of observations: 36 290 
 
Including only PERCENTCHOICE (specification 1) yields a significantly positive 
correlation with test scores in all disciplines. Each standard deviation increase in the 
regional  intensity  of  school  choice  is  related  to  between  12,42
7  (Science)  and  12,57 
(Maths) higher test score points. Our finding that the percentage of school choice has a 
small significant positive correlation to student performance is in line with results on 
school choice from the US mentioned in the introduction. 
Individual and family characteristics have a significant effect on test scores in line 
with the literature. In particular, the number of books at home plays a significant role 
                                                 
783,83*0.15  
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for  scholar  achievement.  This  is  a  common  finding  when  estimating  education 
production functions. The number of books at home is thought to capture the attitude 
of parents towards learning. Parents’ education and living with both parents are also 
significantly related to test scores. The case of gender is interesting, since it shows that 
female students can expect lower scores in mathematics, but higher scores in reading. 
This result is similar to what is generally observed in the literature (e.g., Ehrenberg, 
Goldhaber et al., 1995). Possibly, innate differences in ways of assimilating maths and 
reading between boys and girls and/or unconscious different expectations from each 
gender in each discipline by teachers may yield this gender gap. As expected, attending 
different grades has a very significant impact on test scores in all disciplines. Attending 
one grade higher is related to about 26 points higher test scores. Sufficient availability of 
educational material in a school has a small but significantly positive effect on student 
performance. School educational material measures the sufficient availability of a library, 
software and laboratory equipment which are very specific material resources and they 
are measured in terms of need rather than mere quantity. This could explain why this 
material resources variable has a significant effect contrary to what is found in most 
estimations of education production functions. The coefficients of the school autonomy 
variables  are  not  significantly  different  from  zero  with  the  exception  of  the 
centralisation of school budget. Attending a vocational track is related to on average 
about 42 points lower test scores (i.e. 42 percent of a standard deviation in test scores) 
in all three disciplines.  
The results of specification 2 are presented in Table 4. When the measures of 
school peer quality and the regional intensity of school selectivity (PERCENTSELECT) 
are included, the coefficient of PERCENTCHOICE is reduced by about 25% in all 
three  disciplines  (to  between  9,98  and  9,34  test  scores  points).  The  coefficient  of 
PERCENTCHOICE  now  measures  the  correlation  between  school  choice  and  test 
scores given pupil sorting and peer effects. Theoretical arguments suggest it includes the 
correlation between test scores and increased school effort induced by school choice. 
The  coefficients  of  regional  school  selectivity  PERCENTSELECT  and  of  the 
measures of peer quality in the school are highly significant and positive. A one standard 
deviation increase in PERCENTSELECT is related to between 18,12 (Maths) and 16,12 
(Science) percent of a standard deviation higher test scores
8. The average level of parent 
education in the school and the average number of books at home of peer pupils are 
also  positively  correlated  with  test  scores.  Whereas  higher  average  peer  quality  is 
positively correlated with a pupil’s test scores in line with our expectations, the positive 
coefficient on PERCENTSELECT is in conflict with the hypothesis that pupil sorting 
may  be  harmful.  As  we  have  mentioned  in  section  4,  we  expect  pupil  sorting  into 
schools to affect test scores through several channels. Controlling for peer effects, the 
coefficient of PERCENTSELECT should measure the correlation between test scores 
and the remaining potential effects of school selectivity such as those related to specific 
teaching methods, teacher expectations and the incentive related to selection at the start 
of secondary school on pupil effort at the end of primary school. We conclude from the 
results that the positive effects of school selectivity (related to e.g. incentive to effort at 
the end of primary school or benefits of adapted teaching methods) seem to dominate 
the negative ones (related to e.g. lower teacher expectations in non selective schools).  
                                                 
8 The effect of an increase of one standard deviation of PERCENTSELECT: coefficient in Table 2 times the std 
deviation of PERCENTSELECT (0.23)  
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Table 4: Estimates specification 2, Dependant variable: test scores in Maths, Reading and Science.  
  Maths  Read  Science 
Effect  Coeff.    StdErr  Coeff.    StdErr  Coeff.    StdErr 
Intercept  42,64    36,67  158,13  ***  34,80  30,58    33,92 
Percentchoice  62,24  ***  23,35  66,54  ***  20,77  64,99  ***  20,07 
Percentselect  78,77  ***  17,76  70,20  ***  16,07  70,08  ***  15,55 
Socio eco status 
region  -2,46  ***  0,72  -2,49  ***  0,64  -2,40  ***  0,62 
Class size region  -0,66    0,51  -0,25    0,46  -0,32    0,44 
Unemployment 
rate region  -0,80    0,67  -0,59    0,61  -0,28    0,59 
Boy  24,30  ***  0,78  -28,29  ***  0,81  2,88  ***  0,80 
Age  0,84    1,35  -3,79  **  1,40  3,83  **  1,38 
Number of 
books at home  9,30  ***  0,34  6,37  ***  0,35  8,13  **  0,35 
Non-nuclear 
family  -7,00  ***  0,83  -6,88  ***  0,86  -2,06    0,85 
Home educ 
Resources  7,07  ***  0,37  7,61  ***  0,38  6,37  ***  0,38 
Parents' 
education  1,07  ***  0,26  1,07  ***  0,26  1,58  ***  0,26 
City size  -2,47  ***  0,71  -0,17    0,72  -2,49  ***  0,71 
Grade  27,09  ***  0,76  26,94  ***  0,78  25,37  ***  0,77 
School educ. 
Material  2,56  ***  0,67  2,20  ***  0,68  2,30  ***  0,67 
Centralbudget  7,13  ***  1,48  4,41  **  1,51  4,94  ***  1,48 
Centralcontent  -1,99    1,41  -2,08    1,44  -0,45    1,42 
Centralhiring  3,32    2,33  5,02  *  2,39  3,35    2,35 
Centralwage  4,83    2,48  5,94  **  2,54  4,35  *  2,50 
Mean parent 
education school  22,54  ***  1,32  17,94  ***  1,35  17,91  ***  1,33 
Mean nb of 
books school  30,58  ***  1,70  33,98  ***  1,74  31,34  ***  1,72 
Vocational 
school  -17,28  ***  1,44  -19,00  ***  1,48  -19,65  ***  1,46 
Country 
dummies  yes  yes  yes 
*,**,*** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. 
Number of observations: 36 290 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of specification 4, with crossed 
effects  PERCENTSELECT  times  SCHOOLSELECTS.  Pupils  attending  a  selective 
school  respectively  obtain  9.52  and  8.67  higher  test  score  points  in  Maths  and  in 
Science.  In  this  specification,  the  coefficient  of  PERCENTSELECT  is  reduced  by 
nearly half (to between 10.09 points in reading, and 9.31 points in science) whereas the 
crossed effect is significantly positive for all three disciplines. This implies that pupils 
inside selective schools seem to benefit most from higher regional school selectivity but 
that there is still a positive correlation between test scores and PERCENTSELECT for  
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pupils outside selective schools. A possible explanation is the higher incentive to pupil 
effort at the end of primary school when more secondary schools are selective. In the 
usual absence of objective information on school quality in Europe, school selectivity is 
a strong signal of peer quality. As the percentage of selective schools increases so does 
the chance of admittance and the incentive to effort.  
Moreover, we observe that the correlation between peer quality and test scores is 
stronger than between attending a selective school or PERCENTCHOICE and test 
scores, suggesting that mixing pupils (avoiding sorting of pupils) may be an important 
policy objective when implementing school choice.  
 
Table 5: Estimates specification 3 (crossed effects), Dependant variable: test scores in Maths, Reading and 
Science.  
  Maths  Read  Science 
Effect  Coeff.    StdErr  Coeff.    StdErr  Coeff.    StdErr 
Intercept  64,10  *  36,45  173,68  ***  34,82  24,02    33,57 
Percentchoice  62,48  ***  23,04  66,31  ***  20,78  61,15  ***  19,73 
Percentselect  43,74  **  17,80  43,91  ***  16,32  40,46  **  15,56 
Schoolselects*percentselect  45,99  ***  9,43  36,80  ***  9,66  37,19  ***  9,46 
Schoolselects  9,52  **  3,77  6,79    3,85  8,69  **  3,77 
Socio eco status region  -2,45  ***  0,71  -2,48  ***  0,64  -2,38  ***  0,61 
Class size region  -0,60    0,51  -0,21    0,46  -0,25    0,44 
Unemployment rate region  -0,89    0,68  -0,73    0,61  -0,38    0,58 
Boy  24,36  ***  0,78  -28,25  ***  0,81  10,45  ***  0,79 
Age  0,08    1,35  -4,39  ***  1,40  4,79  ***  1,37 
Number of books at home  9,31  ***  0,34  6,38  ***  0,35  8,73  ***  0,35 
Non-nuclear family  -6,84  ***  0,83  -6,75  ***  0,86  -1,00    0,84 
Home educ Resources  7,02  ***  0,37  7,56  ***  0,38  6,14  ***  0,38 
Parents' education  1,06  ***  0,25  1,06  ***  0,26  1,65  ***  0,26 
City size  -1,44    0,71  0,60    0,73  -2,19  **  0,71 
Grade  27,15  ***  0,76  26,99  ***  0,78  24,91  ***  0,77 
School educ. Material  2,62  ***  0,66  2,24  ***  0,68  2,53  ***  0,67 
Centralbudget  6,86  ***  1,47  4,18  *  1,51  4,78  ***  1,47 
Centralcontent  -1,51    1,40  -1,73    1,44  0,58    1,41 
Centralhiring  2,75    2,32  4,57    2,38  2,19    2,34 
Centralwage  4,52  *  2,47  5,69  **  2,54  3,41    2,49 
Mean parent education school  20,16  ***  1,33  16,11  ***  1,36  16,18  ***  1,33 
Mean nb of books school  29,33  ***  1,70  33,01  ***  1,74  29,37  ***  1,71 
Vocational school  -20,02  ***  1,45  -21,11  ***  1,49  -21,56  ***  1,46 
Country dummies  yes  yes  yes 
*,**,*** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. 
Number of observations: 36 290 
 
The quantile regression estimates for the different quantiles of student test scores 
and their 99% confidence intervals are presented in Figures 3 and 4. They represent the 
coefficients of PERCENTCHOICE and PERCENTSELECT for the five quantiles of 
pupil performance defined in section 4.   
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Figure  3:  Coefficients  of  PERCENTCHOICE,  by  quantile  -  Estimates  from  quantile  regression 
specification 2, 99% confidence interval. - Dependant variable: Test scores in maths, reading and science. 
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Figure  4  :  Coefficients  of  PERCENTSELECT,  by  quantile  -  Estimates  from  quantile  regression 
specification 2, 99% confidence interval. - Dependant variable: Test scores in maths, reading and science 
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It  appears  that  there  is  an  increasing  trend  in  the  coefficient  of 
PERCENTCHOICE  in  Maths  and  in  Science.  However  the  difference  between 
coefficients  at  the  different  quantiles  is  not  significantly  different  from  zero.  The 
coefficients of PERCENTSELECT show a non significant decreasing trend as we move 
up the quantiles of student performance in all disciplines. We interpret these results as 
suggesting that there are no significant differences in the way the regional intensity of 
school choice and of school selectivity affect low versus better performing pupils.  
EJCE, vol. 5, n. 2 (2008) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
154 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimate how the regional intensity of school choice and the 
regional percentage of selective schools relate to student test scores in math, reading and 
science at age 15. In order to be able to control for unobserved country effects with 
country dummies, we include in our sample only countries with centralised educational 
systems. We estimate a classical education production function taking into account the 
hierarchical nature of the data. 
 The regional intensity of school choice is measured as the regional percentage of 
pupils that claim to be in their school because it is know to be a good school. Including 
only the regional intensity of school choice yields a significant positive correlation with 
student test scores in all three disciplines.  
In the absence of reliable information on school quality, school choice may lead 
to pupil sorting by ability and observed characteristics. In a second specification, we aim 
to disentangle the effect of pupil sorting by ability from the ‘residual’ effect of school 
choice. Therefore we include two measures of school-peers’ quality and the regional 
percentage of selective schools in the estimation. Peer quality is measured as the mean 
level of parents’ education in the school, and the mean number of books at the home of 
peer pupils. As a result, the coefficient of the regional intensity of school choice is 
reduced by about 25% in all three disciplines (to between 9.98 and 9.34 test scores 
points)  but  remains  significantly  positive.  This  ‘residual’  coefficient  of  the  regional 
intensity of school choice measures its correlation with test scores net of pupil sorting 
and peer effects. Theoretical arguments suggest this includes the correlation between 
increased school effort induced by school choice and test scores.  
Regional  school  selectivity  is  measured  as  the  regional  percentage  of  school 
directors that claim student academic records are a high priority or a prerequisite for 
admission.  We  find  that  regional  school  selectivity  is  significantly  and  positively 
correlated  with  test  scores.  This  is  an  indication  that  the  positive  effects  of  school 
selectivity (related to e.g. incentive to effort at the end of primary school or benefits of 
adapted teaching methods) seem to dominate the negative ones (related to e.g. lower 
teacher expectations in non selective schools).  
In addition, we observe that the correlation between peer quality and test scores is 
stronger than between attending a selective school or PERCENTCHOICE and test 
scores, suggesting that avoiding sorting of pupils may be an important policy objective 
when implementing school choice. 
Pupils inside selective schools seem to benefit most from higher regional school 
selectivity but there is also a positive correlation between test scores and regional school 
selectivity for pupils outside selective schools. This finding is inline with the hypothesis 
that school selectivity may provide incentives to effort similar to those of an external 
examination.  
Finally, in order to investigate whether school choice and pupil sorting affect low 
versus high performing pupils differently in our model, we apply the quantile regression 
procedure  to  specification  2.  We  do  not  find  significant  differences  in  the  way  the 
regional intensity of school choice and of school selectivity affect low versus better 
performing pupils.  
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